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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATHOF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
\7 
V. 
BRET THOMAS CRIDDLE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
j Priority No. 2 
Case No. 950639-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS AND NATURE OF APPEAL 
Defendant appeals his conviction for theft, a second-degree feloi 
grounds that tin1 dial |udj.u.' was lioslik1 and hiusnl against linn -iml that he v\ as 
uiciMnjv'!^ '!' "> '.i* si*' !"^  < ouiisf! H< •r;** i se defendant was convicted of a second-
degree felony, this Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the relationship between the defendant and the trial judge so 
strained that either the court, trial counsel, or the State should have moved to 
disqualify the judge undea 
t t^ually "reviewing" the 
decision, but evaluating the circumstances of the case to determine whether the 
trial court was actually biased. State v. Neeley. 748 P.2d 1091, 1094-95 (Utah 
1988). In Neeley. the Court ruled that "absent a showing of actual bias or an 
abuse of discretion, failure to [recuse] does not constitute reversible error as long 
as the requirements of section 77-35-29 [now rule 29, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure] are met." LL Because defendant did not proceed under rule 29, he 
must establish actual bias and plain error.1 Defendant also fashions his claim in 
terms of ineffective assistance of counsel.2 Whether trial counsel's performance 
fell within constitutional boundaries is a question of law, which this Court 
reviews for correctness. State v. Saunders. 893 P.2d 584, 591 (Utah App. 
1995). When evaluating an ineffectiveness challenge, this Court reviews the trial 
counsel's performance in a "highly deferentiar manner to avoid "second-
guessing ... on the basis of an inanimate record." LL. 
2. Were there indications of defendant's incompetency before or during 
the trial such that, in order to provide defendant a proper trial or sentencing 
1
 Since no one requested the trial court to act on a disqualification motion, the 
"abuse of discretion" standard does not apply because there was nothing before the court that 
required an exercise of discretion. 
2
 Two attorneys represented defendant: Robert Steele, Legal Defenders' 
Association, handled the pre-trial, trial, and immediate post-trial work; Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
represented defendant during the September 1, 1995 sentencing hearing. Given the breadth of 
defendant's challenges, it appears he claims both counsel were ineffective as well as the trial 
court. 
2 
proceeding, ,t L,UIII|»CI«*IU \ hearing was mandated? Again, defendant did not raise 
this at trial; therefore, defendant needs to show via a plain error analysis, or 
ineffective assistance analysis, that the trial court should have unilaterally 
requested a competency hearing. 
The supreme court spelled out the criteria of showing plain error in State 
v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied 49. .s 11, ,s M4(l 989) as follows: 
The first requirement for a finding of plain error is that the 
error be "plain," i.e., from our examination of the record, we must 
be able to say that it should have been obvious to a trial court that it 
was committing error. ...The second and somewhat interrelated 
requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error affect the 
substantial rights of [a party], i.e., that the error be harmful. 
Defendant also fashions his claim in terms of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Whether trial counsel's performance fell within constitutional 
boundaries is a question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. State 
v. Saunders. 893 P.2d 584, 591 (Utah App. 1995). When evaluating an 
ineffectiveness challenge, this Couii iev vw* ilic iiial < nunst'ls peitormam e i/« a 
"highly deferential" inaiinei l<> avoid "NPUMKI ^uessini' . on the basis of an 
inanimate nvord " J«.f 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
No provisions need to be reproduced in the text or addenda. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
On March 20, 1995, defendant went to trial on a charge of theft, a second-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1995) (R. 163-64). 
That same day, the jury found him guilty (R. 167). After reviewing the pre-
sentence investigation report (PSI) and 90-day diagnostic evaluation at the Utah 
State Prison, the court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of one-to-
fifteen years at the prison and a $5000 fine (R. 203). 
Statement of Facts 
THE THEFT AND THE GREAT TRAILER CHASE 
Stephen Howe had just moved to town from New Jersey, with a trailer full 
of construction tools and pieces of equipment parked at his apartment complex in 
Murray (R. 300). The trailer itself was only seven months old and worth $1500 
to $1800; its contents were worth $15,000 to $18,000 (R. 303). 
Late afternoon on April 22, 1994, Mr. Howe returned home from his job 
at Ken Garff Ford and noticed immediately that the trailer was missing (R. 304). 
Worried that apartment management may have towed it away, he talked to office 
personnel, who denied having taken it (i$L). He also talked with neighbors to see 
4 
if they had noticed anything, but they were unable to help him (R. 307). Finally, 
he called the sheriffs department and a deputy took his statement fid.). 
Only a few miles to the north at about the same i e 
Offi . .• • 
northbound on M.un Sired by 45th South (R. 318). According to reports from 
other drivers, a Toyota truck was pulling a white trailer, which was swerving and 
digging gouges into the pavement (R. 320). As he drove north on main street, 
Officer Johnson noticed one deep gouge in the asphalt; following it, he saw the 
trailer off the road at approximately 3700 South Main where it had hit a 
telephone pole (id.). Officer Johnson pulled off behind the trailer, started 
walking toward it, and saw three men, ading delendai 
t J • i W - * nedback 
t Y rwn I hough the officer already had told them to stop (R. 322). 
Finally, after being hailed once more, the men stopped and placed their hands 
against the truck (kL). Now accompanied by back-up, the police took the three 
into custody and to the police station (R. 322). 
Officer Ben Jones of the Murray police took defendant into custody and to 
the police station where he gave him his Miranda rights and questioned him (R. 
329). Officer Jones recounted defendant's explanation of how he came to be 
involved in the theft. 
He indicated to me that he and two of his friends 
had been drinking all day long,3 and had talked about 
taking the trailer, and they didn't really think they were 
going to do it right at that moment, but as they drove by 
it, one of the friends said, To hell with it, and they 
backed up to the trailer and hooked the trailer to a 
vehicle ... all three of them got out. He didn't 
physically help them hook it up. 
R. 330. Defendant, cooperative in the interview, said that he and his friends 
intended to take the trailer to a pawn shop and sell its contents (R. 331). 
Defendant's cohorts hooked the trailer to the truck and started driving toward the 
Hops and Barley, a bar on 45th South and State street, but because Mr. Howe 
had placed a lock on the hitch, it was not completely fastened (id.). 
Because they wanted to fasten the hitch completely, as well as discover 
what goods they had stolen, defendant and his friends stopped at a Midas Muffler 
close to the Hops and Barley and convinced one of the workers to use a 
blowtorch to take off the padlock to the door (R. 331). When the door opened, 
the powerwasher fell out and defendant and his friends agreed to sell it to 
someone at the muffler shop for five dollars. The worker did not cut off the lock 
3
 Defendant lived at the same apartment complex as Mr. Howe (R. 334). He and 
his friends were at his apartment that day (id.). 
6 
to the hitch, so the trailer was still not completely secured when the three drove 
off, going northbound on Main street, dragging Mr. Howe's trailer behind them 
(iiL). Only a few blocks north, they noticed that the car was running free and 
looked back to find that the trailer had fallen off the truck hitch, swerved off the 
road, and hit a telephone pole (R. 332). 
THE DEFENDANT AND THE JUDGE 
Defendant was out on bail on July 22, 1994 when he missed his pre-trial 
conference (R. 25). Judge Brian issued a bench warrant for his arrest that same 
day, but the police could not find the defendant until January 20, 1995, when 
they arrested him (R. 29). On February 3, 1995, the court held a hearing on the 
bench warrant. 
THE COURT: The defendant is before the Court on a bench 
warrant. He has been gone someplace for several months. 
MR. STEELE [defendant's counsel]: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Where has he been? 
MR. STEELE: Your Honor, Mr. Criddle, my understanding is 
that we had a pretrial, and it was back in the time when the calendars 
actually finished in the morning. He then made contact with my 
office. I wasn't there. And I attempted ~ 
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THE DEFENDANT: I informed the clerk that I was here, and 
your clerk told me that she would hand the message to you. She told 
me that my date had — my time had been at 10:00, and not 2:00. I 
had written 2:00 on my calendar at home. That was the time I 
thought I was supposed to be here. 
THE COURT: That was July 22, 1994. Where have you been? 
THE COURT: Where have you been for eight months? 
THE DEFENDANT: Living at my apartment and working. 
THE COURT: Let's set a trial date. We will know where to find 
you between now and the trial date, for sure. 
MR. STEELE: Your Honor, would you consider setting bail on 
this matter? 
THE COURT: Absolutely not. We have had to go get him. 
THE DEFENDANT: That's a mistake, your Honor. 
R. 239-40. As described later by Adult Probation and Parole Agent, Duane 
Malmboy, while the trial court was making its ruling, defendant mimicked 
shooting the judge: 
[Defendant Bret Criddle turned to the audience and 
made hand signals to a middle-aged female, later 
identified as the defendant's mother. The hand signals 
were made with the defendant's right hand. The index 
8 
finger was pointing straight with his thumb on top and 
the three remaining fingers rolled toward the palm of 
the hand. It appeared to simulate a gun shooting. The 
defendant then pointed to his head and then to Judge 
Brian. It appeared to be a threat that he wanted to shoot 
the judge in the head. 
R. 32. 
By February 7, 1995, defendant had been released due to the overcrowding 
consent decree at the county jail (R. 34). When the trial court learned of this, it 
issued an order for a no-bail bench warrant because of defendant's conduct 
during the hearing (iiL). The police arrested defendant two days later (R. 37). 
Later that month, defendant filed a motion requesting his release (R. 38). In the 
motion, defendant apologized for his conduct on the February 3 hearing, stated 
that he had been interviewed by a "psychologist and psychiatric intake worker at 
Valley Mental Health-Salt Lake County Jail Unit and [had no] mental health 
problems at this time," and promised to appear for the trial (id.). Defendant 
attached a handwritten letter to the motion in which he further apologized (R. 
40). The trial court denied the release motion at a Jail Review hearing on March 
10 (R. 56). 
During the March 10 hearing, the trial court discussed defendant's letter 
and the reasons why it had to deny the motion: "He, simply, indicated that he 
wanted to get out and establish himself in the community and in the neighborhood 
9 
and in the work place, and that he was sorry for what had happened, and that he 
would not be a problem pending release" (R. 245). The trial court recognized 
defendant's sincerity in the apology but stated that, "in its totality, it is not a case 
for release pending trial, in the Court's opinion" (R. 246). He even gave counsel 
additional opportunity to argue his case for release, but counsel chose not to (R. 
245). 
After this hearing and again on March 15, defendant wrote the trial court 
and again asked for a release pending trial (R. 57-60). The March 15 letter also 
set out defendant's version of the facts of the crime and asked for the charges to 
be dismissed (R. 60). Neither letter contains any threats (igL). The trial court 
never acted on the letters. 
On March 20, a jury convicted defendant of theft and he remained in jail 
pending sentencing (R. 168). However, on April 18, 1995, he was again 
released from jail due to the consent decree (id*.). Though he promptly made an 
appointment with AP&P for an interview, he failed to keep it.4 On May 5, the 
court re-scheduled sentencing but ordered defendant kept in custody, and that he 
4
 This information is found in a letter from AP&P to the trial court explaining a 
delay in the presentence report. It is contained in the envelope that also has the PSI and the 
diagnostic report. This Court on March 15, 1996 made those documents part of the appellate 
record. 
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not be eligible for release under the consent decree (R. 169). Sometime later, 
defendant was taken to the diagnostic unit at the prison for a 90-day evaluation 
(R. 172). 
It was during the summer while in the diagnostic unit that defendant began 
writing his letters to the trial judge. These letters were both direct pleas for 
mercy and vague threats of retribution. The first of these letters, dated July 28, 
1995, charged the trial judge with "doing the wrong thing over & over again 
right in front of me" (R. 174). The tone of the letter is not essentially 
threatening, except for the last sentence: "No excuses. No way. You just make 
it as right as you can and we can all walk" (isL). The court received another 
letter on August 14 (R. 176). Again, defendant told the court it had made a 
wrong decision, that it had messed up his life and that "[i]t will hurt that's a 
promise and no pleasure will heal you enough." 
The next letter, dated August 21, 1995, clarified the meaning of 
defendant's claims that the judge would suffer harm: "I'm afraid you've 
misunderstood. I in no way intended to threaten you or anyone else. I have faith 
that good will come to good and bad will come to bad. I meant to alert and warn 
you of a potentially dangerous situation ... .My warning is the same there will be 
irrevocable punishment (repercussions)... . I am not, and do not believe, making 
11 
threat. I simply understand a reasonable, fair, positive, world and in it wrongful 
imprisonment will not go unpunished!" (R. 180) (emphasis in original). This 
letter was followed by a postscript that stated "I personally don't dislike you. 
Outside of this situation, I would not have anything against you at air (R. 181). 
On August 11, the court held a sentencing hearing, which was eventually 
continued because defendant had not reviewed a copy of the diagnostic evaluation 
(R. 375). After rescheduling the hearing, the court discussed the letters with 
defendant: 
THE COURT: The Court is going to inform you this 
morning, Mr. Criddle, that every time you send a letter 
threatening my life, I am going to send it back to the 
Board of Pardons, and I am going to recommend that 
they keep you for the maximum period provided by law. 
This is the third letter that you have sent to me 
threatening my life. You threatened my life once in 
open court. 
THE DEFENDANT: No, I didn't, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Just a minute. Every letter that you send 
to me, I am sending it back in a package to the Board of 
Pardons, and I am going to recommend that they keep 
you every day that is provided by law. You will be an 
old man when you get out of the State Prison. If you 
have a certain amount of fun and frolic out of 
threatening my life, you just have at it, because every 
one of these letters are going to stare you in the face 
when you appear before the Board of Pardons. 
12 
(R. 376). When sentencing finally occurred on September 1, the court explained 
the reason for the sentence: 
The Court has reviewed the presentence report. 
The Court has reviewed the diagnostic evaluation 
conducted at the Utah State Prison. The Court has 
reviewed the correspondence from the defendant to the 
Court. The Court has heard argument from counsel and 
heard statements from the defendant. No legal reason 
has been established why sentence should not be 
imposed. 
The Court notes, for the record, that the defendant is 
not a clean, one owner, as it relates to the judicial system. In 
a very short period of time, as a juvenile, he was before the 
juvenile authorities 18 times, one of them for armed robbery. 
He had his 18th birthday, and never missed a beat. He was 
right back into the system again. He has 18 arrests. ... He has 
a protracted record as a juvenile and as a young adult. At 25 
years of age, he has been in and out of the system repeatedly. 
He has been on probation numerous times. He has had orders 
to show cause. 
(R. 387). 
There were other letters from defendant after sentencing of approximately 
the same tone as the earlier ones (R. 216).5 Additionally, on October 12, 1995, 
the trial judge sent a letter to the Board of Pardons attaching copies of the letters 
5
 Although these letters are included in the addendum to the brief, it is not 
necessary to discuss them in detail here. Because the trial court received them after 
sentencing, they could have no possible affect on defendant's disposition. 
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and asking the Board to let him know when defendant would be released because 
"I am somewhat fearful of this man" (R. 217). 
THE DECISION TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT TO PRISON 
Concerned about defendant's mental stability, both his original trial counsel 
and the trial court agreed that he should have a mental evaluation before 
sentencing (R. 400-01). That evaluation ultimately was conducted as part of a 
90-day diagnostic evaluation at the prison. A psychologist interviewed and tested 
defendant and concluded that he exhibited signs of "alcohol abuse, adult 
antisocial behavior, [and] schizotypal personality disorder with paranoid 
features." Diagnostic Report, at 2-3. Despite these diagnoses, the prison staff 
believed that defendant was fully accountable for his actions and that his primary 
problem was his inability to take responsibility for his conduct. IsL 
Both the presentence report and the diagnostic evaluation strongly 
recommended prison, agreeing unanimously that defendant was an "unacceptable 
candidate for rehabilitation or treatment services. IsL at 4. As the report stated 
in its opening paragraph: "Mr. Criddle has shown through his past behavior that 
he is unwilling to act responsibly while on probation and we feel it is now time 
that he be held accountable for his behavior." LL at 2. The staff was struck by 
defendant's "impulsive, self-indulgent, egocentric, immature, and irritable" 
14 
character, which, coupled with "significant criminal thinking errors" and his past 
criminal history, left "no alternative" but prison commitment.6 I$L Defendant 
refused to accept responsibility for his crime, persistently saying that the 
conviction was a mistake and that "society" was at fault. IsL His refusal to 
accept responsibility led to his unwillingness to participate in an assessment group 
during his evaluation and counseling for alcohol and drug abuse. Presentence 
Report at 9. Not seeming to understand the significance of the evaluation 
process, he told the diagnostic staff "I would like to go home now since prison is 
not really fun and I have been an unbelievably good sport about this whole 
thing." Diagnostic Report, at 3. He also was given a disciplinary write-up for 
destroying state property. LL 
By the age of 25, when this evaluation occurred, defendant had been 
arrested 18 times, convicted seven times, placed on probation for armed robbery 
as a juvenile, and had another probation revoked because he "failed to report to 
[the] probation office on several occasions [leading him to be] considered a 
6
 If the trial court did not know already, it learned through the presentence 
report, that defendant stole another trailer the day before the incident which is the subject of 
this appeal. He was convicted of this crime on April 18, 1995 and Judge Anne Stirba 
sentenced him to a one-to-fifteen year prison term. Undoubtedly, this knowledge had a 
significant impact on Judge Brian's sentencing decision. Judgment, Sentence (Commitment), 
Case No. 951900292, Third District Court. That case is before the Court on a separate 
appeal, Case No. 950687-CA. 
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maximum misdemeanor case." Presentence Report, at 9. Even though he was in 
good health, before the crime defendant did not have a steady job, relying on his 
parents to pay his $600 a month rent and groceries. LL He drank excessively 
though he refused to admit his addiction. IoL. at 13, 14 (refusing to accept 
counseling and failing to show up at AA meetings). At one point he 
congratulated himself for "cutfting] down" on his consumption to the point of 
having only "about one-half gallon" of alcohol every two weeks. IiL 
Continuing his pattern of making vague threats, defendant persistently 
made comments to his agent and diagnostic evaluator such as the following: 
"You're not helping you're hurting I promise it will have an adverse affect. ... 
Absolutely no good is going to come of it. The price will be high. The bill will 
be paid." Diagnostic Report at 4. Because of his continuing refusal to accept 
responsibility, his prior criminal behavior, and conduct during the evaluation, the 
staff believed he posed a "high risk to re-offend" and that prison was the only 
option: "Perhaps Mr. Criddle will benefit if he is incarcerated for a period of 
time prior to having the opportunity to participate in additional treatment." LL 
16 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant challenges his conviction because he believes the trial judge was 
impermissibly biased and hostile against him and that he was incompetent both to 
proceed to trial and to sentencing. Realizing that neither of these issues were 
preserved for the trial court, defendant argues primarily that he is entitled to 
reversal under a plain error analysis; secondarily, defendant also claims his trial 
counsel was ineffective. 
Neither defendant's conviction nor sentence need be reversed under either 
of these doctrines. The trial judge was not actually biased. Before the trial, 
defendant sent a letter to the judge apologizing for his shooting gesture, which the 
trial court accepted as heartfelt. Defendant provides no evidence that anything 
occurred between then and the trial, or during the trial itself, that suggests any 
bias. Regarding the post-trial suggestion of bias, defendant claims the judge was 
biased as a result of the letters defendant sent to the judge beginning on July 28, 
1995. Though these letters contain vague threats, they too do not require 
disqualification. Essentially, what defendant argues for here is that anytime a 
defendant threatens a judge, that judge must recuse himself. As a matter of 
policy, such a stance would send precisely the wrong message and encourage a 
plethora of threatening and intimidating letters to judges. The judge properly 
17 
sent copies of letters to the Board of Pardons and Parole, a sister agency to the 
courts that has an invaluable role in the criminal justice system. The law 
affirmatively requires judges to make recommendations to the board. The mere 
addition of the judge's statement that he is "somewhat fearful of this man" does 
not evidence bias, but merely the result of the judge's months-long observation of 
defendant's character and propensity toward violence. 
Defendant also does not establish that sufficient indicia of incompetency 
occurred that should have led either the trial court or a reasonably prudent 
attorney to question his competency. Both the trial judge and trial counsel were 
concerned about defendant's mental health status and, pursuant to that concern, 
had conducted two separate investigations into mental health, one before trial and 
the jail's mental health unit and one at the prison's 90-day diagnostic center. 
Nothing in either of those reports raised a red flag. The first evaluation indicated 
no sign of mental illness. The prison evaluation diagnosed defendant with 
schizotypal personality disorder but never raised the specter of competency. 
Indeed, nothing in that thorough report suggests an actual inability to comprehend 
proceedings or assist his counsel. Therefore, neither the trial court nor counsel 
erred by not requesting a competency evaluation. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT THE 
TRIAL JUDGE WAS ACTUALLY BIASED; 
THEREFORE, THE COURT'S DECISIONS ARE 
NOT REVERSIBLE ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED 
HIMSELF. 
Defendant challenges his conviction in part on the grounds that the 
trial judge should have disqualified himself due to purported hostility or bias. 
Defendant bases his claim on the judge's comments during the bench warrant 
hearing of February 3, 1995 and the August 11 sentencing hearing, and the 
judge's forwarding copies of his letters to the Board of Pardons and Parole with 
the comment that he is "somewhat fearful of this man" (R. 217). Defendant also 
asserts the trial judge should have recused himself because of threats he made 
upon the judge's life. Brief of Defendant at 16. 
Defendant never filed a motion for disqualification under rule 29, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, he must now show mat the trial judge's 
refusal to unilaterally recuse himself was plain error, i.e., an obvious error that 
affected the substantial rights of the accused.7 State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 
7
 To the extent defendant also makes an ineffective assistance claim, the analysis 
follows along a similar path. Defendant must show that his trial counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the result. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); State v. Perry. 899 P.2d 
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403 (Utah 1994), cert, denied 115 S.Ct. 910 (1995). The threshold step is 
simply whether the trial judge was actually biased as a result of the defendant's 
veiled threats. 
Defendant's assertions of judicial bias have to be separated into two time 
frames, i.e., pre-trial and post-trial, because the bases for the assertions 
substantively differ and are separated by a trial devoid of any indication of bias. 
As explained in the statement of facts, defendant chose not to appear in court for 
a pre-trial conference in July 1994 and avoided arrest on the resulting bench 
warrant for eight months. During the bail hearing in February 1995 after his 
arrest, the judge was terse and clearly indicated his intent not to allow bail. 
During the hearing, defendant made a gesture that simulated shooting the judge. 
Having been notified of this incident by an AP&P officer who was in the 
courtroom, Judge Brian had him re-arrested following his release due to the jail 
consent decree. In early March 1995, the defendant wrote a letter to the judge 
1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995). As this Court stated in State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 175 
(Utah App. 1992), ineffective assistance and plain error share a "common standard,'' i.e., the 
prejudice component. They also share another standard in common: in plain error analysis, 
whether the error was obvious such that the judge should not have made it; in ineffective 
assistance analysis, whether there were events (errors) that would have led the reasonably 
prudent attorney to take a different course of action. Here, the State's main argument under a 
plain error analysis is that there were no indicia of bias that would have led the trial court or 
trial counsel to seek recusal. Thus, both concepts of plain error and ineffective assistance 
proceed similarly and reach the same conclusion. Because defendant's brief appears to 
concentrate on plain error, the State will also focus on that doctrine. 
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apologizing for his conduct. At the March 10 hearing, the judge said he had 
received the letter, believed it was heartfelt, and stated the matter was resolved. 
The trial transcript shows that the judge was passive during the trial. 
Except for ruling on one objection, he made no comments during presentation of 
the evidence, opening statement, or closing argument. Defendant does not claim 
that the trial judge's trial conduct was inappropriate. If defendant is asserting 
that the trial was skewed because of defendant's gestures, the record reveals a 
striking lack of evidence for this claim, given the written apology and the judge's 
comment that he "did not dispute" that it was heartfelt (R. 246). As regards the 
pre-trial part of this proceeding, defendant provides no evidence even of a 
colorable claim of bias. 
Though the post-trial episode technically began with the end of the trial, 
the letters that constitute the basis for this claim of actual bias started on July 28, 
1995, when defendant's first letter reached the judge (R. 174).8 At most, the 
letters are vague assertions not of physical threats but that the judge will "suffer" 
for having permitted conviction. To date, no Utah case has dealt with a potential 
for judicial bias where a defendant has made threats, however vague, to a judge. 
8
 It is important to note here that once the jury convicted defendant of the charged 
crime, the trial court was restricted to sentencing defendant to either probation or a one-to-
fifteen year prison term for the second-degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1995). 
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In two similar cases from Colorado and Indiana, however, the state supreme 
courts ruled that a defendant's threats against a judge did not require 
disqualification. In Smith v. District Court for Fourth Jud. District. 629 P.2d 
1055, 1059 (Colo. 1981), the court ruled that the trial judge's statement that he 
believed the defendant would carry out his threats to shoot him did not mandate 
recusal. The supreme court noted that the trial already had occurred and only 
sentenced remained, precisely the same stage present here. The court said: "The 
judge's comments did not show prejudice against the defendant, but rather 
evidenced his interpretation of the defendant's propensity for violence based upon 
information learned in the course of judicial proceedings. The defendant's 
propensity for violence is a factor which the judge was entitled to consider in 
imposing sentence. Smith, 629 P.2d at 1059. As the Colorado court explained, 
good policy reasons also support a determination not to require recusal on the 
basis of a defendant's threats: "[t]o allow threats toward a judge to cause 
compulsory recusal would enable a defendant to use vulgarity and threats to 
disqualify every judge that did not measure up to his own particular specifications 
or requirements. Smith. 629 P.2d at 1059. 
Regarding defendant's claim that the judge's comments at the sentencing 
hearings revealed bias, the Indiana Supreme Court has ruled in an analogous case 
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that a trial judge's published comments that he was "mad" and "concerned" 
about a defendant's threats did not establish "such prejudice ... as to deprive him 
of the right to be tried before an impartial judge." Yager v. State. 437 N.E.2d 
454, 462 (In. 1982). In so ruling, the court expressed an observation about the 
trial judge's comments that is equally applicable here: "At best the remarks 
attributed to the judge reflect the frustrations he must have felt in dealing with an 
extremely uncooperative defendant who had made thinly veiled threats against the 
judge and other ... officials." LL 
Judge Brian's concern about defendant's mental health also conflicts with 
the claim of judicial bias. An actually biased judge would be uninterested in any 
potential for mitigation. Yet, the trial judge consistently gave trial counsel the 
opportunity to investigate whatever was needed for mental health investigation. 
Both the judge and defendant's counsel agreed defendant should have a mental 
evaluation before sentencing and, for the purpose of obtaining more information, 
the judge ordered a 90-day diagnostic evaluation (R. 400-01). The judge also 
gave defendant and his trial counsel ample opportunity to review and challenge 
the resulting evaluation and pre-sentence report, moving the sentencing date from 
August 11 to September 1, 1995 (R. 387). 
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Contrary to defendant's implicit challenge that the trial court was so biased 
it refused to look at all the evidence, the record shows that the trial judge did 
precisely what he said at sentencing: "The Court has reviewed the presentence 
report. ...the diagnostic evaluation ... correspondence from the defendant. ... 
argument from counsel [and] statements from the defendant" (R. 387). The trial 
judge acted not on hostility or bias, but on the evidence before him, which 
showed a 25-year old "impulsive, self-indulgent, egocentric, immature, and 
irritable" "unacceptable candidate for rehabilitation or treatment services." 
Diagnostic Report, at 2-3. 
Faced with this information, the trial court had no real choice but prison. 
As best evidenced by Judge Stirba's prison sentence for defendant's first trailer 
theft, no reasonable judge could have granted probation to a 25-year old thief 
who had been arrested 18 times, convicted seven times, placed on juvenile 
probation for armed robbery, had another probation revoked, and who 
consistently refused to accept responsibility for practically every crime he had 
ever committed.9 Also, the trial court was entitled to use its knowledge of 
defendant's character in its sentencing determination. Smith, 629 P.2d at 1059. 
These occurrences are documented in the Statement of Facts. 
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Through his persistent failure to show up for court or agency appointments and 
vague threats of retribution, defendant told the court in no uncertain terms what 
type of person he was. As the Colorado Supreme Court said in Smith, "any 
opinions formed for or against a party from evidence or conduct occurring before 
a judge in a judicial proceeding, and the judge's expressions of an opinion do not 
constitute 'prejudice.'" LL 
The trial court's sending copies of defendant's letters to the Board of 
Pardons and Parole also did not evidence a wrongful bias or hostility. The parole 
board is an integral part of the State's criminal justice system, of which the courts 
are also an essential unit. Both law and common sense dictate that courts give 
the board whatever information is pertinent to a criminal's sentence. Utah Code 
Ann. 77-27-13(5) (1995) (court to provide recommendation to board). 
Defendant's letters show relevant aspects of his character that the board, to fulfill 
its role in the criminal justice system, needs to have. 
The sentence was the result of defendant's criminal past, refusal to accept 
responsibility, and blatant unwillingness to change, not judicial bias. The judge 
based his decision on legitimate and wide-ranging sources of information. It is 
no evidence of judicial bias that the only reasonable disposition on that evidence 
was prison. 
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For the same reasons, defendant's interrelated claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must be rejected. Because defendant cannot show actual 
bias, he cannot show ineffective assistance for two reasons: (1) the reasonably 
prudent attorney would have seen, as trial counsel did, that no bias was present; 
and (2) the motion for disqualification would have been denied. It is not 
ineffective assistance for an attorney to refuse to bring a non-meritorious motion. 
Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983). 
H. BECAUSE DEFENDANT EXHIBITED NO SIGNS 
OF INCOMPETENCY DURING TRIAL, A 
COMPETENCY HEARING WAS NOT 
MANDATED. 
Defendant now claims he should be given a new trial because he was 
incompetent to proceed under Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (1995). As with 
defendant's first issue regarding judicial bias, because defendant's competency 
was not raised at trial, he must show plain error or ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Defendant's analysis concentrates on the former, essentially arguing 
that the trial court should have realized he was incompetent and ordered a hearing 
sua sponte. His ineffective assistance claim is secondary but based on the same 
basis, i.e., that defendant's letters should have raised a "red flag" of 
incompetency that would have led the reasonably prudent attorney to initiate 
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competency proceedings. Both claims are without merit for the same reason: 
though the letters evidence increasing bellicosity on defendant's part, they do not 
exhibit indicia of incompetence that would have led either the reasonably prudent 
trial counsel or trial judge to question competency. 
Concededly, defendant never appeared to understand the prerogatives of, 
or respect due, the trial court. However, this failure to understand does not mean 
defendant lacked "a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him or of the [potential] punishment'' or the ability "to consult with his counsel 
and to participate in the proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding." LL As defendant's brief shows, only one episode even 
suggested any emotional problem before trial, i.e., the gestures defendant made 
of shooting the judge. Brief of Defendant at 21. Any concerns this event raised 
though were reasonably alleviated when staff for the Valley Mental Health-Salt 
Lake County Jail Unit reported afterward on February 21, 1995, that defendant 
had no "mental health problems" (R. 38). 
Contrary to defendant's claims, this evaluation shows that trial counsel was 
sensitive to the potential for mental health problems and was actively 
investigating it. Nothing in the record gives any reason why any reasonably 
prudent attorney would have petitioned for an inquiry into competency after 
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receiving this evaluation. The trial was held one month later and defendant 
points to no incident during that month that would have changed a reasonably 
prudent attorney's judgment. £££ Perry. 899 P.2d at 1239 (counsel's 
performance adequate if it falls "within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance."). The trial transcript provides no backing for defendant's claim that 
his conduct during trial was "extremely bizarre." Brief of Defendant at 21. 
Defendant made no statements to the court nor did he testify. The record gives 
no indication that defendant did anything, bizarre or not, during the trial. With 
this paucity of evidence, no attorney could reasonably have contemplated 
petitioning for an inquiry into competency. 
Compared to Pate v. Robinson. 383 U.S. 375 (1966), the first United 
States Supreme Court case to hold that a trial must be reversed because of the 
trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing, the evidence of defendant's 
incompetency is slight indeed. In Pate, the defense had four expert witnesses to 
testify that the defendant was insane along with testimony from his mother about 
his consistently erratic and irrational behavior. Additionally, a police officer 
testified to defendant's behavior during and after arrest. Together, this evidence 
mandated that the trial court inquire into defendant's competency to proceed. 
Pate. 383 U.S. at 385. The evidence here is closer to that in State v. Young. 780 
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P.2d 1233 (Utah 1989), which defendant claims supports her claim that counsel 
should have petitioned for a competency hearing. 
Ironically though, the Utah Supreme Court declared that Young was not 
entitled to a competency hearing. In ruling that the evidence of incompetence 
was insufficient to warrant an inquiry, the supreme court noted that Young had a 
drug and alcohol addiction, that he suffered from slight to moderate depressions, 
and that on one day of the trial he exhibited "some emotional distress." Young. 
780 P.2d at 1236-37. Even together, these signs did not raise a reasonable doubt 
of Young's competency. Young, at 1238. The Young court cited with approval 
a New York case in which the appellate court ruled that defendant's rather 
extreme behavior did not require a competency hearing. In People v. Harris. 491 
N.Y.S. 2d 678, 684-86, the court "found numerous instances of emotional 
courtroom outbursts, including instances where the defendant wept and a recess 
was called because it was not clear whether the defendant 'was going to break 
down.'" Nevertheless, the court refused to order a competency hearing. Young. 
780 P.2d at 1238. 
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Defendant also argues that his post-trial letters and comments should have 
raised doubts about his competency to proceed to sentencing.10 In fact, 
defendant's letters did become more bellicose as his sentencing date came 
closer.11 However, trial counsel was, again, sensitive to the possibility of mental 
illness and took reasonable actions to again investigate defendant's mental status. 
At one pre-sentencing hearing, trial counsel and the court concurred in the 
opinion that defendant needed a mental evaluation (R. 400-01). Prison staff 
conducted this evaluation as part of the 90-day diagnostic and a psychologist 
concluded that defendant had "alcohol abuse, adult antisocial behavior, [and] 
schizotypal personality disorder with paranoid features." Diagnostic Report, at 2-
3. 
Defendant presents no evidence that, faced with such a diagnosis, a 
question of his competence should have been obvious to the trial court or a 
reasonably prudent attorney. The letters defendant now says evidence his 
10
 Apparently, defendant's argument is that, even if he was competent to stand 
trial, he was not competent to be sentenced and, therefore, trial counsel should have petitioned 
for incompetency at this pre-sentencing stage. 
11
 Defendant assumes that this increasing verbal bellicosity is the result of a 
mental disease or defect. Surely another interpretation is that the defendant finally realized 
that he was now going to "be held accountable for his behavior." Diagnostic Report at 2. To 
most people, the prospect of going to prison would frighten; to a person who believes in his 
innocence, as defendant did, it would be a Kafkaesque nightmare. Thus defendant's behavior 
is not necessarily evidence of irrationality so much as fear and consternation. 
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incompetence are not incoherent. They straightforwardly present defendant's 
view of the crime, his protestations of innocence, and his belief that, because the 
judge did a bad thing by putting him in prison, bad things will, therefore, happen 
to the judge. None of these letters indicate an "inability to have a rational and 
factual understanding" of the proceedings and potential punishment or an inability 
to consult with counsel and participate in the proceedings. Defendant's 
participation in the sentencing hearing belies this notion (R. 385). 
The record establishes that defendant's trial counsel made two separate 
investigations into defendant's mental health status. Before trial, after the 
shooting incident, Valley Mental Health determined defendant had no mental 
health problems. After trial and only a few months before sentencing, prison 
staff evaluated defendant, and, while finding that defendant had a schizotypal 
personality disorder, never questioned competency. Defendant confuses the 
presence of a mental illness with incompetency, a description of a functional 
limitation on a person's mental abilities that results from a mental disorder or 
retardation.12 Given this paucity of evidence, there was no "red flag" that would 
n
 "[A] person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental disorder 
or mental retardation resulting either in: (1) his inability to have a rational and factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him or the punishment specified for the offense 
charged; or (2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings 
against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 
31 
have made incompetency obvious to anyone. Therefore, because there were no 
signs of incompetency that would have led the reasonably prudent trial judge or 
counsel to order a hearing, there was neither plain error nor ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLICATION REQUESTED 
Because of the paucity of Utah case law on judicial bias and the minimal 
indicia of incompetency that should trigger a petition or order for a competency 
hearing, the State requests oral argument and encourages publication. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS J^jlday of May 1996. 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
(1995). 
For the purposes of criminal law, a "mental illness" "means a mental disease or defect 
that substantially impairs a person's mental, emotional, or behavioral functioning. A mental 
defect may be a congenital condition, the result of injury, or a residual effect of a physical or 
mental disease and includes, but is not limited to, mental retardation." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-305(4) (1995). Significantly for this case, "[mjental illness does not mean a personality or 
character disorder or abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal conduct." IsL. 
The Human Services Code contains a definition of mental illness that appears broader 
that section 76-2-305. Under Utah Code Ann. § 62a-12-202(8) (Supp. 1995), a mental illness 
means a "psychiatric disorder as defined by the current edition of Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders ... which substantially impairs a person's mental, emotional, 
behavioral, or related functioning." 
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